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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we describe use of the Aquila active well neutron coincidence counter for 
nuclear material assays of 235U in multiple analytical techniques at Savannah River Site 
(SRS), at the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), and at Argonne West 
National Laboratory (AWNL).  The uses include as a portable passive neutron counter for 
field measurements searching for evidence of 252Cf deposits and storage; as a portable 
active neutron counter using an external activation source for field measurements 
searching for trace 235U deposits and holdup; for verification measurements of U-Al 
reactor fuel elements; for verification measurements of uranium metal; and for 
verification measurements of process waste of impure uranium in a challenging cement 
matrix.  The wide variety of uses described demonstrate utility of the technique for 
neutron coincidence verification measurements over the dynamic ranges of 100 g – 5000 
g for U metal, 200 g – 1300 g for U-Al, and 8 g – 35 g for process waste.  In addition to 
demonstrating use of the instrument in both the passive and active modes, we also 
demonstrate its use in both the fast and thermal neutron modes. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we describe testing, efficiency calibration, and use of the Aquila1 active well 
neutron coincidence counter (AWCC) for nuclear material assays and surveys.  The 
instrument was brought to the Savannah River Site (SRS) in 1998 by a Brookhaven 
National Laboratory group for testing of neutron multiplicity algorithms.2  A separate 
group of Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) researchers recognized the 
applicability of the instrument for assay of enriched U-Al fuel ingots at SRS K-Area 
nuclear material storage facility (KAMS).  We set up the instrument using Los Alamos 
National Laboratory INCC software3 to perform verification measurements of U-Al in 
the 1999 annual Department of Energy (DOE) inventory of reactor fuel ingots stored at 
SRS.  Startup of the instrument using the INCC software, efficiency calibration, and the 
1999 verification measurements are described thoroughly in reference 4.  The instrument 
has been used subsequently for these annual DOE inventory verification measurements in 
2000 – 2006 and will continue to be used for the foreseeable future. 
 
In addition to the KAMS U-Al verification measurements, the authors have discovered 
and devised multiple other applications for the active neutron coincidence counting 
technique.  These involve uses in the active and passive acquisition modes and in the 
thermal and fast fission acquisition modes, uses as a portable neutron survey instrument, 
and utility for verification measurements of three distinct types of highly enrich uranium 
over three diverse dynamic ranges.  Specifically we have performed experimental 
programs that include 
 
• Verification measurements of U-Al fuel ingots in the fast fission neutron coincidence 
counting mode with a dynamic range of 100 – 1300 g. 
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• Verification measurements of U metal at Argonne West National Laboratory in the 
fast fission neutron coincidence counting mode with a dynamic range of 100 – 5000g. 
• At-line verification measurements of U process waste in the HB-Line facility at SRS 
in the thermal fission neutron coincidence counting mode with a dynamic range of 5 – 
35 g. 
• Evaluation of neutron background and personnel exposure concerns in the deactivated 
Californium Production facility at SRNL using the AWCC as a passive survey 
instrument. 
• Evaluation of criticality concerns in the decommissioned Naval Fuels facility using 
an external activation source to adapt the instrument as an active survey instrument. 
• Passive neutron multiplicity verification measurements of Pu and mixed U/Pu items. 
 
We describe the experimental programs for each of these measurements in detail in the 
EXPERIMENTAL section of this paper.  We further describe plans to use this 
instrument in DOE Office of Security development work for future non-proliferation 
programs in the DOE, International Atomic Energy (IAEA), and Department of 
Homeland Security.(5-10)   
 
EXPERIMENTAL 
The Aquila AWCC uses two Am-Li(α,n) neutron sources to activate thermal fission in 
the samples.  The AWCC instrument is shown on its side in the photograph of Figure 1.  
A photograph of the Am-Li activation sources and of one of the polyethylene moderators 
is shown in Figure 2.  The two sources have 241Am α-activities of 4.4x1010 dps and yield 
(α,n) neutron rates of approximately 50000 n/sec.  With no sample in place, these sources 
yield an active background of approximately 6537 neutron singles events/sec (eps) in the 
fast fission mode and an active coincidence background of (< 0.1 eps).  Thus the 
instrumental singles efficiency is approximately 7% for the activation sources, with a 
corrected random coincidence rate of <2x10-5.  With the sources placed in the center of 
the sample cavity the detection efficiency was measured to be 25.3(3)%(11).  The latter 
efficiency of 25% is our best measure of sample neutron singles efficiency.  We discuss 
the random coincidence correction, which is a very important part of neutron coincidence 
measurements, below.  
 
Stability in the active background is a very important feature for successful operation of 
this instrument.  In our initial set up back in 1999 we observed over a 112-day period a 
one sigma standard deviation of 35 cps in the active singles background, and a one sigma 
standard deviation of 0.8 eps in the active doubles background.  These variances were 
obtained from five background counts taken fairly evenly spaced over the 112-day 
period.  The passive neutron background (obtained with no Am-Li activation sources) 
was always < 1 cps.  These background rates compare favorably with those taken by 
Cowgill and Lu.1 
 
Active well coincidence neutron counting is a well known technique for assay of 235U 
content in solid samples and has been described previously.3,12,13  Details for this 
instrument are described in references 1 and 4.  The instrument used in the work 
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described here is the extended cavity Aquila Technologies serial number KCC-51-DEV 
well counter.  It contains an assembly of 42 3He detector tubes mounted in two concentric  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
circles in polyethylene moderator blocks.  The neutron signals are summed using a PSR-
B shift register coincidence counting circuit with the detector parameters shown in Table 
1.  For all of the work described in this paper the instrument was operated with the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory INCC neutron coincidence software program.3  This 
program is used for set up, operation, data acquisition, and data analysis to relate detected 
coincidence events to 235U mass.  The program also triggers printing of hardcopy output.  
Examples are included below. 
 
Table 1.  Detector parameters and timing characteristics used for this work. 
Parameter Setting 
Gate width 64.0 µsec 
Predelay time 4.5 µsec 
High voltage 1680 V 
Die-away time 52.36 µsec 
Efficiency 0.25 
Deadtime coefficient A 0.893x10-6 
Deadtime coefficient B 0.201x10-12 
 
 
U-Al Fuel Ingot Verification Measurements at SRS 
Our initial use of the Aquila instrument was for the annual DOE inventory of U-Al fuel 
elements that are stored at the SRS K-Area Material Storage facility (KAMS).  These fuel 
elements were all manufactured at the SRS M-Area fuel fabrication facility.  Though the 
existing fuel is far from virgin material, the M-Area specifications14 required that it be 
Figure 2.  Photograph of one of the 
Am-Li activation sources and 
neutron moderator. 
Figure 1.  Photograph of SRS K-Area 
active well coincidence counter lying on 
its side showing the sample chamber 
and neutron moderators. 
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very pure of fission product and plutonium components.  Because the SRS fuel is pure of 
plutonium, it has a very low passive neutron emission rate and is very well suited for 
assay of the 235U content by active well induced fission neutron counting.  Even though 
the fission product β−γ activity is very low, assay of 235U by γ-PHA is not suitable 
because the fuel elements are dense enough to approach infinite thickness for the low 
energy 186-keV γ-ray from 235U.  
 
We performed an initial set of measurements and activities in the Savannah River Site 
(SRS) K reactor assembly area.  We conducted two separate calibrations of active 
doubles response versus known mass of 235U using U-Al fuel ingots.  The 235U masses 
varied over the range 247 g to 1190 g.  Background counts were taken with the AWCC 
cavity empty as opposed to using a blank ingot.  The two response calibration curves 
were taken fifty-four days apart.  We show data from both in this paper to provide an 
example of the instrument stability.  The data we show below demonstrate excellent 
instrumental stability.   
 
Data for the first calibration at SRS were taken using six 100-second counts for every 
standard. All of the doubles response versus known 235U are shown in Table 2.  The data 
are plotted in Figure 3.  The solid curve is the best quadratic fit to the calibration symbols 
with the curve forced through the origin.  The equation for the calibration curve is  
 
 Doubles(cps) = 0.198m   –  0.0000575m2,  (1) 
 
where m is known mass in grams of 235U.  The calibration data of Table 2 include 
235U/236U enrichment ratios, which vary over the range 1.39 to 3.95.  These data 
demonstrate the independence of the method from this parameter. 
 
Table 2. 235U calibration measurements taken with the K-Area KCC-51-DEV active 
well coincidence counter using 100 second counting times and automatic 
background subtraction and random coincidence subtraction as described in text. 
Standard known mass 
(grams) 
singles rate 
(cps) 
doubles rate 
(events/sec) 
triples rate 
(events/sec) U
U
236
235
 
031 617 558.7 97.19±5.43 Not observed 3.93 
023 1190 921.5 164.0±10.0 19.6±2.0 1.94 
011 754 725.5 86.01±6.47 13.8±3.0 1.94 
051 517 488.2 115.0±4.5 Not observed 1.39 
032 640 543.0 105.8±10.2 Not observed 3.95 
026 247 277.4 35.17±11.52 5.5±1.5 1.94 
054 493 548.6 84.47±4.38 7.1±2.9 1.39 
043 666 553.1 105.4±11.8 13.2±2.9 1.95 
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Figure 3.  Fit of SRS calibration data of equation (1). 
 
Note in Table 2 that the uncertainty in the doubles rate for the 247 gram standard is 
almost 33% for this short 100-second counting time curve.  For the second acquisition of 
calibration data we were interested in reducing that uncertainty as well as demonstrating 
the stability of the calibration curve after the instrument had been powered off for a long 
time period.  To demonstrate both of these objectives we acquired a new calibration 
curve using five of the same calibration standards spanning the same range of mass.  This 
time we acquired data on the 247-g and 1190-g standards for six 300-second counts, and 
we acquired the data for the other three standards for the six 100-second counts.  These 
data were acquired 54 days after the calibration data of Figure 3, where the instrument 
was powered off for the intervening duration.   
 
The second set of calibration data are plotted in Figure 4 along with the best fit 
calibration curve.  Note we obtain much better precision for the 247-g standard.  The 
equation for the curve is   
 
Doubles(cps) = 0.188m   –  0.0000434m2.  (2) 
 
Equations (1) and (2) are very similar in shape and agree within experimental uncertainty 
over the entire calibration range.  Equation (2) has a positive first derivative all the way 
out to masses greater than 4 kg.  The excellent agreement between the two curves  
demonstrates the good stability of the instrument. 
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Figure 4.  Fit of SRS calibration data of equation (2). 
 
We have used this instrument for the verification measurements required for the 1999 – 
2006 DOE inventory of U-Al fuel ingots stored in the K-reactor Assembly area at SRS.  
The instrument has been very stable over this period of six years.  We were able to use 
the efficiency calibration curve of equation (2) for the 1999 – 2001 verifications.  It was 
necessary to recalibrate in 2002 and again in 2004 as the background singles and doubles 
rates had changed significantly in K-Assembly.  In Table 3 we show the measured active 
backgrounds and active doubles rates for the 1190-g and 247-g standards for the 1999, 
2002, and 2004 calibrations.  The shape of the calibration curves never changed 
significantly from those of equations (1) and (2).    
 
Table 3.  Comparison of 1999, 2002, and 2004 calibration data. 
 1999 2002 2004 
Background singles 5555 6567±4 6797±4 
1190 doubles 164±10 169±5 175+4 
247 doubles 35±12 43±2 46±2 
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The 1999 – 2006 verification measurements are plotted in Figure 5.  The best linear fit of 
the data in Figure 5 has a slope of 1.0037, which demonstrates excellent correlation of 
measured doubles rate with U-235 mass.  These data demonstrate very good analytical 
performance characteristics for the active well counter for use in assay of U-Al fuel 
ingots.  
Figure 5. Measured twenty-six point verification data acquired for instrument 
qualification. 
 
 
We have already noted the independence of this measurement technique from the 
235U/236U ratio.  In our verification acquisitions of 1999 – 2005 we have observed the 
declared enrichment for each of the items.  The total uranium masses varied over almost a 
factor of 1.5.  The ratio of declared 235U mass to total mass varied over the range 0.082 to 
0.14.  The capability of the instrument to perform these U-Al verifications appears to be 
independent of 235U enrichment.      
 
Argonne West Metalic U Measurements 
In May of 1999 we conducted an extensive set of data acquisitions at Argonne West 
National Laboratory in Idaho Falls.  These experiments were conducted mainly to test a 
Brookhaven National Laboratory multiplicity algorithm, but were also very valuable to 
test the instrument’s 235U coincidence assay capabilities at higher masses and coincidence 
rates.  In these experiments we conducted important acquisitions to test the passive 
coincidence rates contributed by samples up to 5 kg in 235U mass and up to 35g in 236U 
mass and 1460 g in 238U mass.  We also observed the effect of (α, n) reactions and 
neutron multiplication on the singles rate and coincidence rate.  In the Argonne West 
experiments we used pure, metallic U samples with 78% enrichment. 
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The acquisitions at Argonne West (ANL) were performed by starting with a sample that 
contained 5.098 kg of 235U and then removing an aliquot of the sample as we progressed from 
one acquisition to the next.  Therefore each sample counted represented identically a portion of 
the previous sample.  This is opposed to the SRS measurements that were made on completely 
distinct samples each time.  For each ANL acquisition we obtained multiple counts (generally 
ten) of duration varying from 60 seconds up to 3600 seconds.  Data were acquired using the 
fast fission counting parameters of Table 1. 
 
The data acquired are summarized in Table 4.  The 235,236,238U masses were determined 
gravimetrically and calculated from the known stoichiometry.  The instrument singles, 
doubles, and triples responses are shown in the table, including two active background 
counts.  In Table 5 we have listed the singles and doubles response for three passive 
acquisitions.  The data of Table 5 were acquired with the Am-Li activation sources 
removed from the instrument.  Note that the passive singles background is very nearly 
independent of sample mass and that the doubles and triples rates are only very slowly 
varying.  
 
The doubles data of Table 4 are plotted in Figure 6.  The coincidence data are fit with the 
quadratic curve 
 
    Doubles(cps)     = 1.8 + 0.109m  +  0.0000004m2.   (3) 
 
The extremely good linearity of equation (3) demonstrates that the instrument response is 
a reliable measure of 235U mass over the entire range 0 to 5 kg.  That is, second order 
non-linear effects like detector deadtime, neutron absorption, passive neutron production 
by (α,n) or spontaneous fission, and neutron multiplication are not significant factors.  
We note that the best fit quadratic coefficient is positive in equation (3), which might 
indicate neutron multiplication begins to contribute at the high masses.  
 
Neutron Multipication 
Neutron multiplication can cause a significant contribution to neutron multiplicity assays 
of Pu metal items.  We have observed that multiplication is a very important 
consideration for the assay of receipted metallic Pu items at the SRS KAMS facility.15 
Modeling multiplication correctly is very important for passive multiplicity assays of Pu 
and for active multiplicity assays of U16,17, so we observed our data closely for indication 
of such effects in the high mass region of the metallic U active coincidence assays.  We 
are almost without doubt observing limited multiplication at ANL with the triples to 
doubles ratios that we discuss below.  However we believe that multiplication is not a 
significant contributor to the overall coincidence rates observed and that multiplication is 
clearly not a dominant factor in our acquisitions.  Multiplication, like random 
coincidences, would tend to make the doubles rates bend upward from linearity.  
Contrary to the shape of the SRS coincidence curves of Figures 3 and 4, the ANL 
coincidence data of Figure 6 bends very slightly upward, perhaps indicating minor 
contributions to multiplication at the high mass end of the curve. 
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Table 4. Measured neutron singles, doubles, and triples rates in events/sec for 
fifteen active data acquisitions obtained at Argonne West Laboratory.  
The samples are identified by 235U mass.  The 238U masses are also 
tabulated.  All enrichments are 78% 235U.  The singles rates do not include 
background subtraction.  The active singles background was 6900(200) 
events/second.  
 
235U 
Mass (g) 
238U 
Mass (g) 
234,236U 
Mass (g)
singles rate 
(events/sec)
Doubles rate
(events/sec) 
Triples rate 
(events/sec) 
5098 1360 86 8302±4 575±5 221±3 
4490 1198 76 8222±4 503±5 181±3 
3991 1064 57 8128±4 446±4 142±3 
3482 929 59 8009±4 377±4 109±3 
2842 758 48 8038±4 325±4 86±2 
2993 798 51 7897±4 329±4 93±2 
2512 670 42 7796±4 275±4 69±2 
2501 667 42 7823±4 279±4 71±2 
2019 539 34 7660±3 225±3 52±2 
1501 400 25 7476±3 172±3 35±1 
993 265 17 7261±2 113±2 20±1 
493 131 6 7245±1 54±1 8.8±0.6 
260 69 4 7192.4±0.4 30.5±0.4 4.3±0.2 
BG1 0 0 7093±4 -3±4 -3±2 
BG2 0 0 6759±4 1±3 -3±2 
 
 
Table 5. Measured singles and doubles response data acquired for four passive 
counts.  These data were acquired with the activation sources removed from the 
instrument. 
235U 
Mass (g) 
Singles 
(cps) 
Doubles 
(cps) 
Triples 
(cps) 
Background 852±2 0.5±0.09 -0.05±0.09 
493 849.3±0.1 0.30±0.04 0.080±0.008 
2842 859±2 1.6±0.6 0.4±0.1 
2842 2nd  859±1 1.6±0.4 2.2±0.4 
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Figure 6. Neutron doubles rate data plotted versus U-235 mass for the data 
acquired at AWNL. 
 
Ratio of Triples to Doubles 
We finally investigate the ratio of triples events to doubles events in the SRS U-Al 
measurements and ARL metallic U measurements.  That ratio is plotted in Figure 7 for 
the ANL and in Figure 8 for the SRS data.  Note at SRS the ratio T(riples)/D(oubles) is 
nearly flat, equal to 0.11, and independent of sample mass.  At ANL the data are clearly 
related to sample 235U mass.  The ratio T/D at 5098 grams is 0.38(1) and  still rising.  The 
ANL T/D data are in good agreement with data acquired by Ensslin at the Oak Ridge  
Y-12 plant.18   
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Figure 7. Ratios of observed triples to observed doubles acquired in the ANL 
experiments. 
 
 
Figure 8. Ratios of observed triples to observed doubles acquired in the SRS 
experiments.  
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Since the neutron multiplicity for 235U fission is 2.41, neutron multiplication can cause 
the T/D ratio to climb with increasing fission (increasing mass).  It is not surprising that 
this effect is observable at ANL for masses ranging up to 5 kg with 78% enrichment and 
not observable at SRS for mass of only 3kg with only 14% enrichment.  The increasing 
T/D rate at ANL is undoubtedly affected by neutron multiplication, and it is slightly 
influencing measured doubles rates.  However, over the mass range of samples we 
measured, neutron multiplication has only a very slight effect.  Another factor is the 
simple multiplicity of 235U fission.  With increasing fission rate, the probability of 
detecting a true triple coincidence goes up.  The measured T/D ratios clearly indicate to  
us that active multiplicity analysis becomes an important consideration for highly 
enriched U metal samples, and we are developing that technique of analysis at our 
facility. 
 
Trace Uranium Verifications in Desicooler Material at the SRS HB-Line Facility 
In September of 2003 we used the Aquila active well counter for verification 
measurements of enriched uranium in a concrete matrix at the SRS HB-Line Facility.  
These measurements and the sequence of events from which the requirements evolved are 
described in reference 19.  In this set of at-line acquisitions we used the instrument in the 
thermal fission mode to perform verification measurements in a challenging concrete 
matrix that was in the early stages of drying.  In these acquisitions the dynamic range of 
235U content was 8 – 35 g, which is far below the range of the fast fission measurements 
described above.  A further complication was the young age of the concrete matrix, 
which yielded variable moisture content and thus variable moderation. 
 
The HB-Line facility was involved in a campaign to dispose of 4.3 kg of FB-Line 
Desicooler material (HEU oxides).  Facility Operations planned to mix the material with 
Portland cement and de-ionized water to create a waste form that meets the 
Attractiveness Level E criterion for “SNM micro-encapsulated in refractory compounds 
or in solid-dilution”.   To meet these requirements the material was repackaged into 172 
one-gallon paint cans.  Each paint can would contain approximately 3 kg of cement waste 
and 8 – 40 g of 235U.  The DOE-SR approval directed that the discard campaign use the 
FB-Line accountability shippers values and that HB-Line Facility and the Savannah 
River Material Protection and Accountability group provide verification measurements of 
the solid waste product.  At the time of planning, the HB-Line facility was not able to 
provide the required verification measurements with any available assay equipment.  The 
Analytical Development Section (ADS) of the SRNL recommended use of the ADS 
active well coincidence counter to provide the required measurements at-line on-going 
with the production campaign.  
 
We transported the Aquila AWCC to the HB-Line facility and set up the counter inside 
the contamination area of the facility operations.  The personal computer and INCC 5.02 
acquisition and analysis software were set up remotely outside of the contamination area 
as shown in the photograph of Figure 9.  A photograph of the at-line use of the instrument 
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is shown in Figure 10.  After each paint can preparation and a period of two hours for 
drying, the can was introduced directly into the AWCC cavity for a verification 
measurement of the reported FB-Line HEU content.  A one gallon paint can fits almost 
exactly into the cavity of the active well.     
 
 
Figure 9.  Remote Set up of the HB-Line acquisition station. 
 
 
Figure 10.  At-line set up of instrument in HB-Line facility. 
 
Using one of the activation sources centered in the instrument cavity as a sample we 
performed passive acquisitions in both the fast and thermal mode to observe the singles 
rates.  We observed a singles efficiency of 27.8% in the thermal mode and 25.1% in the 
fast mode.  The latter efficiency was in extremely good agreement with the measured fast 
mode efficiencies above.  Since sensitivity of the method would be an important issue for 
the low mass range, we elected to use the thermal mode of operation with the identical 
acquisition detector parameters and timing characteristics of Table 1.   
Savannah River National Laboratory  WSRC-MS-2006-00187 
Page 14 of 29 
01/08/07  
 
The time demands of the project did not allow us an experimental program to re-evaluate 
the die-away times and deadtime correction parameters for the thermal mode of 
acquisition.  We anticipated that the observed singles and doubles rates would be low 
enough that deadtime corrections would have little impact.  It is likely that an 
experimental measure of the optimum die-away time of the detectors would be slightly 
longer than the fast fission value of 52.36 µsec.   Optimizing the die-away time would 
influence the shape of our calibration curve, but we believe our calibration data below 
demonstrate a good instrumental response.  
 
After selecting the thermal mode of acquisition, we fashioned a block of the cement 
matrix with a cavity so that we could use it to simulate the effect of the matrix.  We 
placed one of the activation sources into the cavity of the cement block and then placed it 
inside the AWCC well.  With that configuration we observed our singles efficiency of 
neutrons coming from the simulated sample matrix.  Our measured efficiency was 23.1%. 
 
HB-Line operators made three working standards of Desicooler material using the 
identical process to distribute the standard HEU material in actual cement matrices.  
These working standards had HEU contents of 8.57 g, 28.28 g, and 32.35 g.  We 
calibrated the instrument using these three working standards using twenty 900-second 
acquisitions.  The measured neutron rates are listed in Table 6, and the doubles efficiency 
calibration curve is shown in Figure 11. 
 
Table 6. Measured rates in events per sec for the three calibration acquisitions with 
the working standards. 
Item 
Number 
Acquisition 
Number 
Declared 
235U (g) 
Singles 
(cps) 
Doubles 
(cps) 
Triples 
(cps) 
WD6-04 39JK5235.CAL 32.35 295.0±0.6 110.4±0.5 10.5±0.3 
WD6-05 39KJ5053.CAL 28.28 343.3±0.6 102.6±0.5 9.3±0.3 
WD6-06 39LJ1712.CAL 8.57 121.1±0.6 50.7±0.4 4.5±0.2 
 
Over the next several weeks we performed verification measurements on 67 product 
samples as directed by the Department of Energy-Savannah River.  A scatter plot of the 
verification measurements is shown in Figure 12.  Figure 12 excludes measurements on 
three items that had huge positive biases in the results.  We were able to trace the bias on 
those items to contributions from spontaneous fission of Pu trace contamination in those 
items.  We confirmed this by removing the activation sources from the AWCC and 
counted all three items in the passive acquisition mode.  We observed up to 2900 cps of 
passive singles, up to 180 passive doubles/sec, and up to 19 passive triples/sec on these 
items.  The DOE-SR customer accepted our evaluation of these items and waived the 
required verification measurements on them.  Since these desicooler items came 
originally from FB-Line, it was not difficult to accept the likelihood of trace Pu 
contributions. 
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Figure 11.  Desicooler Calibration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12.  HB-Line Verifications 
 
The verifications of Figure 12 and the calibrations of Figure 11 contain corrections to the 
observed singles and doubles rates that were derived by Cowgill in reference 2.  This 
correction deals with leakage multiplication for the active well counter.  The corrected 
doubles rate (Dc ) is evaluated relative to the observed doubles rate (Do) in equation (4). 
 
( )2o
o
c SS
DD =  ,  (4) 
 
where S is the total singles for the item assayed (including active background) and S0 is 
the active singles background.  For our assays the largest doubles correction was less than 
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5%, and the largest verification mass correction was 7 g of HEU.  While none of these 
corrections improved the verification measurements significantly, they did significantly 
improve the linearity of the calibration curve of Figure 11.  Cowgill has evaluated our 
verification measurements obtained on metallic U at Argonne West National Laboratory 
above, and has demonstrated the very slight upbending of the curve of equation (3) is due 
to multiplication, as we suspected.2        
 
This very successful campaign proved to be an adequate basis for subsequent SRNL 
acquisitions to book unknown U values in receipted Desicooler samples from FB-Line.  
When ATS received Desicooler samples whose total U content were in the region of 
100g, and whose apparent content was far less than that, they requested assay assistance 
from AD.  We performed transmission corrected γ-PHA assays on these samples as well 
as neutron activation acquisitions with our portable active well counter.  The results of 
these combined acquisitions allowed SRNL MC&A to book new and more credible, 
lower HEU values for eight receipted samples.20   
 
These book value acquisitions were performed in 2006, 29 months after the HB-Line 
Desicooler campaign.  Before performing the thermal mode active well book value 
measurements, we used the active well in the passive neutron multiplicity mode to 
confirm there were no significant Pu contributions to the SNM contents of each sample.  
We discuss passive neutron multiplicity verification measurements with the active well 
counter in the last section of this paper. 
 
We do not tabulate the active assays of these eight samples, but list results only.  Each 
had measurable active doubles rates in the range –0.5 – 0.4 events/sec, but each was 
below the sensitivity limit for the assay method.  We were able to set limits of 4 g 235U in 
each sample.  This limit of detection is in excellent agreement with the content measured 
by γ-PHA of 0.03 – 3.8 g HEU.        
 
SRTC Passive Neutron Activites 
In a fourth demonstration of the utility of the Aquila active well counter, we set it up as a 
portable neutron monitor for passive acquisitions in the Savannah River National 
Laboratory (Savannah River Technology Center) F-wing Californium Production Facility 
to evaluate the anomalous behavior of the observed neutron background of that facility.21  
Over the years of the 1990’s the F-wing of SRNL was believed to have a neutron 
background that was due solely to the 252Cf stored and held up in the facility.  However 
by 1999 it was obvious that the neutron background was not decaying with the suitable 
2.6-yr 252Cf half-life.  The authors were requested to investigate the issue. 
 
Using the active well counter as a portable passive neutron detector we obtained passive 
singles and coincidence rates at multiple acquisition points on both the service floor and 
main floor of SRNL F-wing.  The singles rate results are shown in Figures 13 and 14.  
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Using this technique it was an easy process to identify the hot spots on both floors of the 
F-Wing facility.  On the main floor the highest neutron rate was observed to be 10859 cps 
in room F-103, which is immediately above the service floor room F-003 where we 
observed a rate of 33155 cps.  One hotter spot (45321 cps) and another high rate (22706 
cps) were observed on the service floor.  The latter two could be likely associated with 
the Californium Production Facility, while the former two could not.  The observed 
passive doubles rates added very interesting data.   
 
If the neutron background could be associated with 252Cf from the Californium 
Production Facility as assumed, then there ought to be an observable doubles rate.  That 
is, 252Cf produces neutrons from spontaneous fission, and these neutrons can be expected 
to have a multiplicity of near three.  We would expect the doubles rates to be strongly 
suppressed compared to the observed singles rates because the source was not inside our 
portable monitor.  But we expect the doubles rates to be non-zero.  
 
 
 
 
 
919 
1076 
45321 
33155 
22706 9283 
3753 
Service Floor Neutron Singles Rate 
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Figure 13.  Neutron Singles Rates observed on the main Floor of Building 773-A F-wing.
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wing. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14.  Neutron singles rates observed on the service floor of Building 773-A  
F-Wing. 
 
Our hypothesis for the hot spot in F-003 was that the source was not 252Cf but rather a 
PuBe or AmLi neutron activation source.  Neither of these two would be expected to 
yield doubles events.  Or experimental observations shown in Table 7 supported the 
hypotheses associated with the observed singles rates.  Note the doubles rate associated 
with the singles rate of 45321 that we denote as CAM-39 is 137 events per second, and 
the doubles rate associated with the singles rate of 22706 that we denote as Glovebox 10 
is 119 events per second.  The doubles rate associated with the singles rate of 33155 that 
we measured outside of F-003 is (–4.6±8.6) events per second and the doubles rate 
associated with the singles rate of 10859 that we denote as filer 329 is only (18±12).  The 
other two acquisitions in the area (Filter 326 and filter 327) have no measurable doubles 
rates.    
 
Note also the SED facility, which is associated with Pu production, does not have a 
measurable doubles rate.  We concluded that the singles rates near the CPF were 
predominantly from decay of 251,252Cf while the high rates near F-003 came from a PuBe 
neutron activation source.  To further reinforce our conclusions, we obtained passive  
γ-PHA analyses of each neutron acquisition point using a portable high purity germanium 
(HpGe) detector. 
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Table 7. SRTC F-Wing Neutron acquisitions. 
Location Singles uncert Doubles uncert Triples uncert
CAM-39 45321.0 5.1 137.3 12.6 -12.8 13.7
Check point 1 2321.1 0.5 -0.4 0.3 -0.2 0.1
Check point 2 2341.3 0.9 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.1
CPF Cell 919.3 0.7 -0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0
Outside F-160 139.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Filter 329 10859.2 10.5 18.0 12.4 0.2 7.177
Filter 327 7945.2 8.9 -13.5 9.0 -5.3 -4.3
Filter 326 11160.7 10.6 -6.2 12.7 -4.2 7.0
F-091 B-Wall 8746.5 2.1 -1.5 2.2 -0.4 1.2
F-151 SED  2395.5 1.7 0.1 0.9 0.3 0.3
F-003 from F-002 2059.8 0.7 -0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1
F-151 SED 2 2431.5 1.5 -2.4 0.4 0.1 0.2
F-003 from F-091   33154.5 4.1 -4.6 8.6 -11.8 8.4
F-091 glovebox 10 22705.7 3.4 118.6 5.9 2.0 4.8
 
We do not show any of the γ-ray spectra we obtained.  Each of the important ones are 
displayed in reference 21.  The spectra from F-091 glovebox 10 and from a 252Cf source 
displayed multiple transitions at 177-, 227-, 253-, 333-, and 388-keV that originate from 
the isotopes 249,251Cf co-produced with 252Cf.  None of these were observed in the spectra 
from outside F-003 or from outside the SED facility.  The SED facility spectrum 
contained a very strong signal from multiple γ-rays associated with 239Pu decay, and the 
spectrum obtained from outside F-003 contained a transition at 153-keV from decay of 
238Pu.   
 
We finally obtained neutron acquisitions from the Analytical Development Section 252Cf 
neutron activation facility to confirm that we would observe passive measurable doubles 
rates from a 252Cf source external to our well counter.  Table 8 summarizes those 
acquisitions where with each successive acquisition we have brought the source closer to 
the portable active well instrument.  Acquisition b003source1 was obtained from 9 feet, 
the next two from approximately five feet on successive days, B-003 Cf 4 was obtained 
from 3 feet, and B-003 Cf 5 was obtained with the source inside the chamber of the active 
well counter.  It is clear that a 252Cf source produces a doubles rate that rapidly drops off 
with distance.  This decrease in doubles rate can be attributed to the simple geometric 
distance effect as well as to the increased scatter which eliminates the coincidence 
relationship between correlated neutrons.       
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Table 8. Neutron acquisitions in Californium neutron activation facility obtained in 
experiments with Cf-252 source. 
    
Acquisition Singles uncert doubles uncert triples uncert 
B-003bg328 24.31 0.24 0.026 0.019 0 0.003 
b003source1 1351.09 1.80 0.818 0.751 0.008 0.156 
B003source2 4100 400 9.2 8.0 0.2 2.5 
B-003 Cf 3 4748.8 3.4 6.47 2.65 1.614 0.879 
B-003 Cf 4 66101.54 13.54 2585.80 41.80 16.87 52.48 
B-003 Cf 5 460641.604 49.4 127709.193 497.0 12525.339 911.582 
 
From the passive data acquired with the neutron well counter in SRNL F-Wing 
associated with the passive γ-PHA data and associated with the passive data acquired 
with the neutron well counter with a known 252Cf source, we were able to determine 
conclusively that the SRNL F-Wing neutron background was not composed exclusively 
of 252Cf activity.  We were also able to identify the two main sources of non-252Cf 
neutron activity.  Upon our evaluation and recommendation, the PuBe source that we 
“discovered” in F-003 was removed.  This substantially reduced the contemporary 
neutron background in F-Wing and transformed the existing background to one that is 
decaying as expected with the 2.6-year 252Cf half-life.  Module F-003 has been renovated 
into a productive actinide chemistry laboratory.   
    
247-F Activation Analyses 
The last use of the Aquila active well counter that we discuss is one in which we 
evaluated the HEU content of two incompletely labeled 55-gallon drums discovered in 
the deactivation and decommissioning of the 247-F Naval Fuels (NF) Facility at SRS.  
The two drums were discovered inside of a warehouse used by the NF facility.  The 
drums were not adequately labeled but appeared to be spaced apart with fixed geometry 
to ensure criticality safety.  The apparent fixed geometry raised criticality concerns with 
regard to movement of the two drums.  Since the facility was constructed with the 
intention to manufacture nuclear propulsion fuel for the navy, a criticality concern was a 
credible event.22-24  The Facilities Disposition Department (FDD) requested the authors to 
conduct a nondestructive assay to determine if these drums contained fissile materials and 
in what quantity. 
 
Our initial evaluation of these two drums utilized segmented transmission corrected  
γ-PHA of each of the two drums.  These acquisitions and the calculations are described in 
reference 25.  A photograph of one of the acquisitions is shown in Figure 15.  For the 
transmission correction of each drum segment we measured the direct transmission of the 
661.6-keV γ-ray using a 137Cs transmission source.  From each direct measurement of 
transmission of the 137Cs we calculated an areal density for the segment and from there 
calculated the absorption of the 185.7-keV γ-ray from decay of 235U.  From the corrected 
detection rate we determined limits of content for each segment in both of the two drums.  
Our measured data established limits of 1 g and 0.4 g of 235U in the two drums.   
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Figure 15. Photograph of the Naval Fuels gamma PHA setup. 
 
While these γ-ray measurements appeared to completely satisfy the criticality concerns of 
FDD, the calculated transmission corrections for the six segments of the two drums 
ranged from 1.07 to 12.91 and clearly demonstrated a non-uniform distribution of mass 
inside the drums.  The correction factors of 9.6, 12.9, and 7.6 in one of the drums 
demonstrated a content of very highly absorbing items.  We believed that a neutron 
measurement was required to confirm and reinforce our passive γ-ray measurements. 
 
To obtain neutron measurements of the 235U content of these two drums it was necessary 
to devise a method to activate any HEU that might be present in the drums and to count 
the fission neutrons generated.  Since it was not possible to place the 55-gallon drums 
inside of our active well detector, it was necessary to activate and measure the drums 
externally.  An external efficiency calibration was required.  A slab detector would have 
been the ideal solution.  SRNL now possesses just such a detector26, but we did not at the 
time.    
 
The external activation efficiency calibration was performed on the loading dock of the 
M-Area Reactor Fuel Fabrication Facility using a 252Cf source, scratch polyethylene 
moderation and reflection, and with fourteen HEU sources.  The fourteen separate 
sources allowed us to perform the calibration with multiple combinations of HEU mass 
that ranged from less than one gram up to 400 grams.  We obtained activation data for 
increments of approximately 50 g from 0 to 400.  The 252Cf source strength was 
approximately 105 neutrons/sec (reference 27).  In each case the separate HEU sources 
were placed inside of an empty 55-gallon drum and the 252Cf was rested on top of the 
drum as shown in Figure 16.  Polyethylene reflection and moderation were set up as 
shown in Figure 16.   
 
The measured singles and doubles rates are listed in Table 9, where the active 
background rates of 252Cf only have been subtracted from the measured data using the 
INCC software.  While the activated doubles rates are not conclusive, it is clear that the 
measured singles rates correlate with 235U mass in the range 150 g – 300 g.  Using this 
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technique of neutron activation, we believe that our measurement system is sensitive to 
HEU masses down to 150 g 235U.  We performed neutron activation measurements on the 
two drums.   
 
 
Figure16. Photograph of the Cf-252 activation setup for the AWCC. 
 
Table 9.  Measured neutron singles and doubles rates in the external activation 
calibration. 
Acquisition 
Name 
Item 
ID 
Singles 
(cps) 
sigma 
singles 
Doubles 
(cps) 
sigma 
Doubles 
cf in poly Background 450.81 1.38 1.8 0.35 
300g u activated all u 300 g 110.6 2.99 4.07 1.15 
allminus100 u 200 g 31.21 3.28 0.96 1.23 
allbut150g u 150g 19.78 3.27 1.54 1.23 
allbut200 u 100g 20.3 3.27 2.01 1.22 
50gram u 50g 24.74 3.27 -0.17 1.23 
 
The AWCC measurements allowed us to qualitatively search for chunks of material.  
The AWCC is designed to use observed neutron coincidence rates to measure HEU 
content of samples that are placed inside the well of the instrument.  For those samples it 
has a sensitivity of approximately 50 g when used in the fast mode, as our U-Al and 
metal U results above demonstrate.  In this adoption we have utilized the instrument to 
count neutrons from samples that have been activated external to the instrument.  This 
greatly reduces our detection efficiency, so that measuring coincidence events was not 
practical.  We have attempted to measure neutron singles rates to search for evidence of 
activated 235U.   
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Our activation measurements of the two drums in the Naval Fuels warehouse facility 
yielded null results.  Neither the measured singles nor doubles rates were above active 
background rates of 1190 singles/sec and 15 doubles/sec. While the AWCC results we 
obtained did not allow us to set limits of HEU chunks inside the drums, we were able to 
state that we had negative qualitative evidence of any such chunks being inside the 
drums. 
 
Passive Neutron Multiplicity Measurements in SRNL      
In August and December of 2005 the Actinide Technology Section of SRNL received 
separate items of special nuclear material that appeared to be mislabeled.  On each 
occasion ADS was requested to perform a confirmatory measurement of the items to 
confirm content.  For both receipts we performed a passive γ-PHA analysis to confirm 
HEU content in the August receipt and to confirm 238,239Pu content in the December 
receipt.  In each case the γ-ray measurement was adequate for confirmatory identification 
of the nuclear material, but in neither case was the γ-ray measurement unambiguously 
acceptable for quantitative assay.  The HEU measurements was made difficult be the 
strongly absorbing material, and the Pu-isotopics assay was made difficult by the very 
high rate coming from the 238Pu component.  We quickly recognized the advantage that a 
portable neutron multiplicity counter would have given us.  
 
Subsequent to the 238,239Pu γ-ray acquisitions we tested the Aquila instrument for its 
capabilities as a passive neutron multiplicity assay device for Pu content.  Our nuclear 
material stored in the SRNL nuclear NDA laboratory was especially well suited for this 
test.  We have two Pu sources of varying isotopics and multiple HEU sources that allow 
us to compile incremental sources of HEU of up to 400 grams in 235U mass.  One of the 
Pu sources has contents of 0.65 g 239Pu and 0.13 g 240Pu and the other has contents of 
6.92 g 239Pu and 0.26 g 240Pu.  The latter item also has a content of 1.04 g 235U and 40.75 
g 238U.  Together these items can make up a composite sample of 7.57 g 239Pu and 0.39 g 
240Pu.  They will yield three test samples that we could use to qualify the active for 
passive Pu NMC verification measurements.   
 
The results of the passive neutron multiplicity analyses of these “three” samples are listed 
in Table 10.  Note we have two separate acquisitions of the first sample 500411 to 
demonstrate the difference obtained between comparatively short and comparatively long 
acquisition times.  From the data of Table 10 we believe the active well counter has 
demonstrated excellent capabilities to perform passive neutron multiplicity analyses of Pu 
in the mass range 0.8 – 10 g.   
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Table 10.  Measured neutron event rates and verification results for the passive 
multiplicity assays of the Pu nuclear material in the SRNL NDA facility. 
Acquisition 
Name 
acquisition 
time 
parameters 
declared 
Pu mass
(g) 
Singles
(cps) 
Doubles
(cps) 
Triples 
(cps) 
verification 
Pu-240 
mass (g) 
Total Pu 
verification 
mass (g) 
Background 25 cycles x 21 
seconds 
0 41.2±0.3 0.28±0.22 0.000±0.000 N/A N/A 
Null 
sample(1) 
6 cycles x 37 
seconds 
0 21.2±1.1 -0.11±0.18 -0.01±0.07 -0.003±0.024 -0.056±0.487 
500411 21 cycles x 26 
seconds 
0.78 164.9±0.7 1.73±0.12 0.106±0.019 0.058±0.010 0.829±0.145 
500411 36 cycles x 32 
seconds 
0.78 163.2±0.5 1.60±0.08 0.139±0.016 0.035±0.008 0.500±0.090 
M15197 18 cycles x 50 
seconds 
7.91 120.6±0.6 14.9±0.2 1.49±0.06 0.353±0.007 9.88±0.19 
combined 14 cycles x 46 
seconds 
8.69 322.0±0.9 18.14±0.26 1.810±0.084 0.401±0.015 8.196±0.312 
M15197 + 200 
g HEU 
15 cycles x 42 
seconds 
7.91 336.9±0.6 18.08±0.27 1.719±0.081 0.415±0.016 8.476±0.318 
 
We subsequently performed NMC verification measurements on receipted HEU samples 
from FB-Line and from the F-Area Material Storage facility so that we could treat them 
as HEU unknowns for our AWCC monitor.  The measured values for these samples are 
shown in Table 11.  Note all five appear to have null or very low Pu content.  Item 
M015283 was measured as non-zero, but trace Pu content even with a measured NMC 
alpha value of 21.965 ± 8.891.  With this very large (α,n) singles component we would 
expect the active well measurements for HEU to be biased high.  Similarly item 
M015237 had an NMC alpha value of 63.850 ± 64.505, yet we were able to demonstrate 
a total Pu content of less than measurable.  Item M015284 had an alpha value of 56.127 ± 
109.442 with a measured Pu content of 0.133 ± 0.256 (i.e. less than detectable).  Each of 
the acquisitions in Table 11 confirmed that the samples were eligible for active well 
analysis for HEU content. 
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Table 11.  Measured neutron event rates and verification results for the passive 
multiplicity assays of the ATS HEU nuclear material. 
Acquisition 
Name 
acquisition 
time 
parameters 
declared 
Pu mass 
(g) 
Singles
(cps) 
Doubles
(cps) 
Triples 
(cps) 
verification 
Pu-240 
mass (g) 
Total Pu 
verification 
mass (g) 
Background 
ATS Lab 1 
17 cycles x 46 
seconds 
0 17.666± 
0.151 
0.026± 
0.009 
0.000±0.000 N/A N/A 
M015237 20 cycles x 20 
seconds 
0 152.04± 
0.67 
0.280± 
0.100 
0.019±0.010 0.009±0.009 0.188±0.188 
Background 
ATS Lab 2 
34 cycles x 450 
seconds 
0 10.543± 
0.026 
0.043± 
0.002 
-0.005±0.013 N/A N/A 
M015284 8 cycles x 13 
seconds 
0 93.892± 
1.002 
0.038± 
0.007 
-0.005±0.013 0.006±0.013 0.133±0.256 
M015283 18 cycles x 20 
seconds 
0 91.420± 
0.535 
0.200± 
0.067 
-0.001±0.007 0.016±0.006 0.323±0.127 
Background 
ATS Lab 3 
17 cycles x 38 
seconds 
0 22.813± 
0.188 
0.039± 
0.013 
-0.000±0.000 N/A N/A 
M015273 20 cycles x 20 
seconds 
0 17.205± 
0.191 
0.028± 
0.013 
0.006±0.000 -0.002±0.000 -0.039±0.006
M015287 95 cycles x 500 
seconds 
0 93.892± 
1.002 
0.038± 
0.007 
-0.005±0.013 0.006±0.013 0.133±0.256 
 
In Table 12 we show measurements of four samples of special nuclear material using 
passive neutron multiplicity counting to demonstrate the capabilities of the active well 
counter for Pu verification measurements.  For none of these four samples did we have a 
certified Pu-240 isotopics content, so we used a constant value of 6.0% in each of the 
analyses. The multiplication and calculated alpha values for each are listed in Table 13, 
which also contains the multiplication and alpha values for the very successful NMC 
verification acquisitions of Table 10.  Note in three of the four tests of Table 12 we were 
able to demonstrate very good agreement within the uncertainty of the unknown Pu-240 
isotopics.  For sample 50014671 the instrument calculated a large multiplication and a 
very large and negative alpha value with a very large uncertainty.  (Note the huge singles 
rate of 52782 cps.)  This assists an operator to note when multiplicity counting fails.  
However even in the event of failure, the analytical software projected very large 
uncertainties in the Pu-240 and total Pu verification masses.  These uncertainties assure 
that the operator would not “believe” and accept the measured values. 
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Table 12.  Measured neutron event rates and verification results for the passive 
multiplicity assays of Pu special nuclear material. 
 
Acquisition 
Name 
acquisition 
time 
parameters 
declared 
Pu mass 
(g) 
Singles
(cps) 
Doubles
(cps) 
Triples 
(cps) 
verification 
Pu-240 
mass (g) 
Total Pu 
verification 
mass (g) 
Background 
ATS Lab 4 
7 cycles x 67 
seconds 
0 141.454±
0.550 
0.1109± 
0.076 
0.006±0.006 N/A N/A 
Null 
sample(2) 
44 cycles x 141 
seconds 
0 -0.115 
±0.128 
-0.002± 
0.011 
-0.001± 
0.001 
0.057±0.025 0.403±0.064 
50014668 8 cycles x 78 
seconds 
101.40 1339.256
±1.964 
238.342± 
1.241 
28.657± 
0.534 
5.260±0.047 87.708±0.779
50014499 10 cycles x 70 
seconds 
14.71 879.373±
1.377 
30.237± 
0.526 
2.789± 
0.147 
0.682±0.040 11.370±0.662
50014671 8 cycles x 116 
seconds 
35. 52781.52
±6.09 
199.025± 
16.119 
30.926± 
19.334 
-3.561±10.319 -59±172 
20015077 13 cycles x 120 
seconds 
0 0.216± 
0.627 
0.031± 
0.087 
0.004± 
0.004 
0.001±0.002 0.010±0.027 
 
Table 13.  Measured neutron event rates and verification results for the passive 
multiplicity assays of Pu special nuclear material. 
 
Acquisition 
Name 
Acquisition time 
parameters 
Multiplication Alpha 
Null Sample (2) 44 cycles x 141 seconds -1.074±2.330 -0.772±0.254 
50014668 8 cycles x 78 seconds 1.057±0.002 -0.056±0.007 
50014499 10 cycles x 70 seconds 1.017±0.004 3.974±0.27 
50014671 8 cycles x 116 seconds 1.020±0.023 -57.988±166.440 
20015077 13 cycles x 120 seconds 1.075±0.226 0.262±3.362 
500411 21 cycles x 26 seconds 0.993±0.006 10.147±1.892 
500411 36 cycles x 32 seconds 1.006±0.005 17.349±3.901 
M15197 18 cycles x 50 seconds 1.032±0.004 0.298±0.022 
combined 14 cycles x 46 seconds 1.027±0.004 2.063±0.105 
M15197 + 200 
g HEU 
15 cycles x 42 seconds 1.022±0.004 2.109±0.106 
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CONCLUSIONS 
We have demonstrated six distinct applications of the SRNL Aquila active well neutron 
coincidence counter for measurement of 235U, 240Pu, and for evaluation of 252Cf and 
238,239Pu contributions to observed ambient neutron backgrounds.  The neutron activation 
measurements of 235U content utilized both the fast mode and the thermal mode of 
neutron measurement to demonstrate nondestructive assay in three distinct mass ranges 
and for three distinct chemical forms of HEU.  Use of the active well counter as a 
portable passive neutron monitor allowed us to determine the composition of the SRNL 
F-wing neutron background to explain why the background was not decaying with the 
appropriate half-life of a pure 252Cf composition.  The observations yielded identification 
of a 238Pu(Be) source that was removed.  The module was subsequently renovated for use 
as a productive chemical laboratory.  We have also demonstrated the use of the active 
well instrument with external activation analysis to evaluate criticality concerns of two 
55-gallon drums stored in an apparently critically safe geometry in the SRS Naval Fuels 
facility.  Finally we have demonstrated the use of the active well monitor in the passive 
neutron multiplicity mode for 240Pu and total Pu assays. 
 
The quantitative nondestructive assay measurements include determination U metal, U-
Al, and Desicooler uranium waste.  Nondestructive assay of U metal in the mass range of 
0 – 5000 g were demonstrated using the fast mode of activation at the Argonne West 
National Laboratory.  Nondestructive assay of U-Al in the mass range of 50 – 1300 g 
were demonstrated using the fast mode of activation at the SRS K-Area Material Storage 
facility.  These nondestructive assay measurements have been used for seven successive 
years of verification measurements in the DOE annual inventory of U-Al fuel ingots.  
Finally nondestructive assay of waste Desicooler U material using the thermal activation 
mode in the mass range of 5 – 35 g were demonstrated at the SRS HB-Line facility.  
These measurements provided HB-Line the capability for waste processing verification 
measurements that satisfied DOE requirement for discard of 4.3 kg of HEU as 
Attractiveness Level E material.  
 
The thermal and fast modes of neutron activation were applied for measurement of HEU 
in the regime of < 4 g to assist with book value measurements of 235U in the Actinide 
Technology Section of SRNL.  To confirm each of the four samples assayed by 
activation were pure of Pu contributions, we performed a neutron multiplicity analysis on 
each of them.  Null results were obtained, thus clearing the samples for activation 
analysis of HEU.  For six of seven other SNM samples and composite SNM samples we 
have demonstrated accurate verification measurement capabilities using the passive 
neutron multiplicity measurement mode.  These samples had Pu contents in the range 0.8 
g – 100 g with interfering HEU contents of up to 200 g.   
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